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WITTER v. TAGGART

AND
AMMIRATI v. WIRE FORMS, INC.:
THE POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF NEW
YORK'S NEWLY RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION
OF "CHAIN OF TITLE" AND NEWLY
EXPANSIVE DEFINITION OF "EASEMENT
BY NECESSITY"
Kenneth L. Gartner*
INTRODUCTION

Imagine yourself as a homebuyer. You and your family have
undergone an extensive search that has finally led you to the house
of your dreams. While other houses may have appealed to you, only
this one boasted a majestic view of a permanently protected nature
preserve. When you and your attorneys examine the deed to this
house, you clearly see that the right to this scenic view is included in
the deed and is part of the property. You buy the house with the
knowledge that you will forever be able to enjoy the view.
Years later, your neighbors construct a structure that destroys.
this view. You look to the justice system to protect your rights. Imagine your outrage when the highest court in your state refuses to
protect your rights.
This was the plight faced by the Witter family. The Witters and
the Taggarts owned adjoining properties in East Islip, Suffolk
County, New York. The properties lay on either side of a narrow
canal. 1 Both properties fronted onto the broad expanse of
Champlin's Creek (also known as Winganhauppague Creek).2 The
* J.D., 1978, Cum Laude, State University of New York at Buffalo; B.A., 1975, State
University of New York at Buffalo. The writer, a member of the Mineola, New York law firm
of Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., was the attorney for the plaintiff in the Witter case
discussed herein.
1. Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 339 (N.Y. 1991).
2. Record on Appeal at 51, Witter.
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two properties were both formerly part of the 134-acre Meadow
Farm Estate of Charles Lanier Lawrance. After Lawrance's death,
Lawrance's heirs, in 1951, sold what became the Witter property to
Witter's predecessors in title, W. Hunting Howell and Elizabeth H.
Howell. 3
The property's principal attraction and main economic value lay
in its unobstructed view across Winganhauppague Creek to the permanently wooded forest land on the other side.' This unobstructed
view was so important to the value of the property that when
Lawrance's heirs conveyed the property to the Howells, the parties
created and placed in the deed an easement of unobstructed view to
run with the land.' In 1963, the Howells sold the property they had
received from Lawrance's heirs to William Witter.6 Witter was
shown the easement, and took note of the fact that the house on the
3. Id. at 28-33, 285-86.
4. See infra note 34. Any development of the land on the opposite side of the creek is
prevented by the land's status as a preserve.
5. Record on Appeal at 30-3, Witter. The Court of Appeals in Witter believed that
Lawrance personally, rather than his heirs entered into the conveyance to Howell, and that it
was only thereafter that Lawrance died and his heirs conveyed the servient parcel. Witter, 237
N.E.2d at 339. Although the Witter court ultimately attributed no legal significance to this
factual assumption - arrived at sua sponte - the assumption was, in any case, without any
Record support. Lawrance predeceased the transfer of any portion of the Meadow Farm estate, and both relevant transactions were in fact entered into by Lawrance's heirs. Record on
Appeal at 28-33, 285-6, Witter. In the deed the sellers promised:
The parties of the first part [Charles Lawrance's heirs] hereby covenant that no
docks, buildings, or other structures shall be erected, nor permitted to be erected,
nor shall any trees, plants or shrubs be planted nor permitted to be planted upon
other lands presently owned by the parties of the first part lying north of a line
projected and directed outward on a true company course of southwest, commencing
at that point where the south boundary courses of the described premises south 82"
26' 30" west and north 89" 23' 20" west intersect, which shall obstruct or interfere
with the outlook or view from the premises hereinbefore described over the waters of
Winganhauppague Creek.
Id. at 29-30.
Similarly, the buyer promised:
The parties of the second part [the Howells, grantees] covenant that they will not
erect, or permit to be erected, any dock upon, nor use, or permit to be used, for the
permanent mooring of boats or vessels, that portion of the described premises which
adjoins the south line of the said premises for the length thereof identified by the
courses north 89° 23' 20" west and south 82 ° 26' 30" west, but this restriction shall
not be construed to prevent the bulkheading or staving of such shoreline.
Id. at 30.
Both parties were bound by the following terms: "It is mutually agreed that the covenants
herein contained shall run with the land herein described and shall bind the parties hereto,
their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns." Id. at 30.
6. Record on Appeal at 23-27, Witter.
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irregularly configured shore-front premises had been located and so
constructed at an angle as specifically to maximize the use of the
protected view. 7 Indeed, the house's main feature was an abundance
of picture windows looking directly out on the protected view.8 Witter thus bought and paid for the property (including the easement)
in reliance on the existence of the easement."
In 1962, another part of the Meadow Farm Estate was conveyed by Lawrance's heirs to Francis H. Hawkes. 1 The easement
was not recited in Hawkes' deed itself." This is the root of Witter's
problem, since the Hawkes property was sold to the Taggarts in
1984.12 While Lawrance's heirs sold the dominant parcel (eventually
owned by the Witters) with the express promise that the view would
be protected," they did not recite their promise in the deed of the
14
servient parcel.
The promise made by Lawrance's heirs to Witter's predecessors
was, however, and always has been, a matter of public record. Indeed, the Witter property's easement of unobstructed view was
brought to Hawkes' attention, and Hawkes took title with actual notice: the certificate and report of title which Hawkes received from
Security Title & Guaranty Company1 re-printed the entire subject
easement language in haec verba,18 and listed the easement on
Schedule B of the title policy as an exception ("Exception No. 10")
to title insurance coverage.17 For 36 years, both the owners of the
former Howell property and the owners of the former Hawkes property honored the subject easement to their mutual benefit.18 Edward
Taggart was the president and sole shareholder of Boatland, Inc., a
commercial boat dealership in Lindenhurst whose "demonstrator"
boats he customarily used for personal purposes.1 9 When the Tag7. Id. at 158-59.
8. Id. at 158-59, 164.
9. Id. at 158.
10. Id. at 39-40.
11. See id. at 39-40.
12. Id. at 75.
13. Id. at 215.
14. Id. at 74-5. A dominant parcel is one receiving the benefit of a particular covenant
or restriction, while a servient parcel is one whose use is in some way restricted or limited by
the same covenant or restriction. David D. Siegal, N.Y. State Law Digest No. 385.
15. Record on Appeal at 215, Witter.
16. Id. at 215.
17. Id. at 227.
18. Id. at 158-59.
19. Id. at 174-80.

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:101

garts purchased the former Hawkes' property from the Moorings,
they were specifically deeded the use of a boat slip at the adjacent
marina for the docking of any boat they might own.2 0
In June 1987, twenty-four years after he purchased his home,
William Witter was surprised to see a seventy-foot wooden pier extending out into the creek from the Taggarts' shoreline. 2 The pier
had been pre-fabricated off-site, so Witter did not have an opportunity to observe it until it was floated in and tied to poles sunk in the
creek bed. 2 Witter immediately called Edward Taggart and when
Taggart came over to Witter's property, Witter walked with Taggart
down to the water line of Witter's property.2 3 Witter showed Taggart the deed containing the easements, pointed out how the pier
obstructed Witter's view in violation of the record easements, and
requested the removal of the pier.2 ' Taggart refused, and Witter
commenced an action seeking an injunction requiring the dismantling of the pier.2 5
This article focuses on the injustices faced by the Witters as
they sought to enforce their rights to an unobstructed view, across
Champlin's Creek to the scenic nature preserve. This fight took the
Witters all the way to the highest court of New York State.26 In
deciding against the Witters, not only did the New York State Court
of Appeals ignore facts, but it disregarded and revised existing precedent. 7 In Witter v. Taggart,2 8 the Court of Appeals created an
absolute rule whereby if a common grantor deeds out a portion of his
premises (in a county utilizing a grantor-grantee title indexing system), and the deed contains a written express easement, the common
grantor may nevertheless unilaterally invalidate the interest he has
conveyed to this innocent purchaser simply by conveying his servient
parcel to another without mention of the recorded easement. 2
In arriving at this rule, the Court of Appeals failed to either (a)
forthrightly articulate the policy considerations which might support
such an apparently startling result, or (b) overrule Ammirati v Wire
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 89.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 159, 183.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Witter v. Taggart, 543 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 339 (N.Y. 1991).
See Witter, 577 N.E.2d at 341-342.
Id. at 338.
See id. at 338.
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Forms, Inc.,3" a precedent which is directly contrary to the Witter
holding. Instead, the court in Witter purported to "distinguish" Ammirati based upon facts which are not contained in and are in fact
negated by both the Ammirati opinions and record. The result of the
court's herculean effort to avoid overruling Ammirati was a decision
which, rather than basing its result on sound and defensible policy
considerations, (a) artificially limited the definition of the term
"chain of title" to one which, if logically adhered to, denudes New
York's Recording Act"1 of its primary value, and (b) expanded the
concept of the "necessity" required to imply the existence of an easement beyond all previous expectations. These actions by the court
possess the potential for wreaking havoc on the current title system

in New York.
I.

EASEMENTS OF UNOBSTRUCTED VIEW

32
The value of an unobstructed view is settled and accepted.
Easements of unobstructed view are thus recognized as valid and
have been enforced by the courts of New York since the beginning
of the twentieth century.3 3 The unrebutted testimony of an expert

30. 76 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1947), rev'd, 273 A.D. 1010, 78 N.Y.S.2d 844 (2d Dep't
1948), aff-d, 298 N.Y. 697 (1948).
31. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 1989).
32. Tara J. Foster, Note, Securing a Right to View: Broadening the Scope of Negative
Easements, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 269 (1988) (describing numerous examples of how panoramic views of skylines and water increase the financial value of real estate).
33. Zipp v. Barker, 57 N.Y.S. 569 (App. Div., 2d Dep't. 1899), affid, 59 N.E. 1120
(N.Y. 1901). "[Tlhe plaintiff obtained an easement to light and air and unobstructed view;
and with this easement a court of equity will not interfere, or permit interference by others
who are privies to the covenant." Id. at 6; see also 2 WILLIAM X. REED, WARREN'S WEED ON
THE NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, Easements §23.01, at EASE-I ll (Oscar L. Warren ed., 4th ed. rev'd 1990) (citing Zipp, 57 N.Y.S. 569); Annotation, Express Easements of
Light, Air and View, 142 A.L.R. 467, 468 (1943) ("It is universally assumed, without controversy, that easements of light, air and view may be created by express grant"); and I AM. JUR.
2d, Adjoining Landowners §90 (1962) ("There is no doubt that easements of light, air and
view may be created by express grant"); Rainbow Shop Patchogue Corp. v. Roosevelt Nassau
Operating Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup.Ct. 1969), aff'd, 310 N.Y.S.2d 231 (App. Div., 2d
Dep't 1970) (enforcing an easement of unobstructed view granted to the tenant of a store in a
shopping mall against the erection of a kiosk obstructing shoppers' view of hue tenant's store
windows).
Such easements have been recognized in California. See, e.g., Pacific Home Owners'
Ass'n v. Wesley Palms Retirement Community, 224 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Ct. App. 1986) (although
"[als a general rule, a land owner has no natural right to air, light or an unobstructed view
and the law is reluctant to imply such a right . . . . [Nevertheless] [sluch a right may be
created by private parties through the granting of an easement ..
" Id. at 382.; Seligman v.
Tucker, 86 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1970) (granting a mandatory injunction requiring defendants to remove, or lower, an addition to a single family home which in violation of plain-
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real estate appraiser was that blocking the view in the Witter case
had resulted in a substantial diminution of the property's value. 4
Despite these unrefuted conclusions, the Supreme Court of Suffolk
County," the Appellate Division, Second Department,36 and the
tiffs
easement "unreasonably obstructed" the view from plaintiffs' home); Petersen v. Friedman, 328 P.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1958).
In Petersen, the parties' common grantor, when conveying plaintiffs property to plaintiff's
predecessor, had granted plaintiff's predecessor:
a perpetual easement of right to receive light, air and unobstructed view over that
portion of the real property hereinabove described, to the extent that said light, air
and view will be received and enjoyed by limiting any structure, fence, trees or
shrubs upon said property hereinabove described or any part thereof [to certain
specified height limits] ....
Id. at 265.
The servient parcel retained by the grantor was subsequently transferred by mesne conveyances to defendants. The defendants erected a television aerial which exceeded the limited
height. Plaintiff instituted an action seeking an injunction requiring that the aerial be taken
down, and prevailed. Id. In affirming that judgment, the Appellate Court held:
The language of the easement is clear and leaves no room for construction or determination of the intent of the parties, as contended by the defendant. Its purpose is
to avoid any type of obstruction of the light, air and view without regard to the
nature thereof. The reservation was not limited to the use then being made of the
servient estate, but extended to all uses to which the servient estate might thereafter
be devoted ....
Id. at 266.
Such easements have also been recognized in other states. See, e.g., Roehrs v. Lees, 429
A.2d 388 (N.J. Super. 1981) (reversing trial court and finding for plaintiff in action based on
defendant's construction of the second floor of his house in such a manner that it encroached
on 25-foot setback requirement meant to protect plaintiff's unobstructed ocean view); Gawtry
v. Leland, 31 N.J.Eq. 385, 388 (1879) (enjoining a landowner from building a large, permanent ocean front pavilion, where a covenant prevented him from building anything which
might obstruct or interfere with the view or prospect from a structure on the grantor's premises, and where "[iut is obvious that it was the intention of the parties that the ocean front of
the lot should be kept free from everything which could, in any way, to any considerable
extent, obstruct the view of the ocean ....");McDonough v. W.W. Snow Construction Co.,
306 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1973) (affirming an injunction requiring defendant to take down the second
story of a house which encroached on plaintiff's right to an unobstructed view of Lake Champlain and the Adirondack Mountains lying beyond).
34. In his sworn affidavit, expert real estate appraiser, James G. Taylor stated the following conclusions:
The property is considered to be unique and to have had exceptional views across
Champlin Creek (Winganhauppague Creek). The view, which adds a substantial
value to the property, has been partially obstructed as a result of the construction of
a large pier directly opposite the dwelling. The pier which is sufficient in size to
dock three boats is also lighted, which further disturbs the views provided from the
main living area . . . lilt is my opinion that if the subject property were to be sold,
the selling price would be substantially lower as a result of the loss in the unobstructed waterviews.
Record on Appeal at 164-165 Witter, (emphasis added).
35. See Witter v. Taggart, 543 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
36. See Witter v. Taggart, 561 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Div., 2d Dep't. 1990).

WITTER v. TAGGART

1992]

Court of Appeals, 7 found the view not to be protected because it
was not recorded in the Taggart's "direct chain of title." 38
II.

CHAIN OF TITLE

The term "chain of title" is a highly abstract concept that is
difficult to define. 39 Theoretically, the "chain of title" refers to the
''rationale often invoked to resolve priority between competing
claimants to interests in land." 4 ° Typically, a purchaser of land embarks upon a title search to ensure that the seller actually has the
right to sell it and that the land is free from all hidden liens and
encumbrances."1 Since sales of real property are required to be in
writing 42 and to be publicly recorded,4 3 the "chain of title" concept
44
is intrinsically linked to local recording statutes.
Suffolk County uses a grantor-grantee indexing system.45 In a
grantor-grantee index:
As each instrument is received, the name of the grantor, mortgagor, vendor, or other granting party is placed on the appropriate
page of the index followed by the name of the other party to the
document, the book and page of the record, description of the property, dates, etc. At the same time there is entered alphabetically in
the same index, or in a separate index, the name of the grantee,
mortgagee, vendee, or other receiving party with like information
as to the instrument. Whether kept together, or (as is usually the
case) separately, these are quite generally 46known respectively as
the 'grantor index' and the 'grantee index."

While a title search involves checking these indices,'4 a searcher
37. Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1991).
38. See Witter, 543 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Witter, 561 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App.
Div., 2d Dep't. 1990); Witter, 577 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1991).
39. See Harry M. Cross, The Record "Chain Of Title", 57 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 788
(1957).
40. Id. at 787.
41. See id.
42. N.Y. REAL. PROP. LAW § 316-a(1) (McKinney 1989).
43. Id.
44. Cross, supra note 39, at 787.
45. "Section 316 of the Real Property Law ... adopts the grantor-grantee index as the
official type of index for the entire state," even while exempting recording offices that have
adopted numerical indexing from its provisions. JAMES M. PEDOWITz, REAL ESTATE TITLES 34
(1984) (construing N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 316-a (McKinney 1989)).
46. 1 RUFFORD G. PATTON, PATTON ON LAND TITLES §67 at 224 (2d ed. 1950) (citations omitted).
47. See supra notes 45-6 and accompanying text.
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is only required to discover conveyances that are in his/her "chain of
title". 4 While a purchaser is deemed to have constructive notice of
any transactions that are within the "chain of title",4 9 any transactions outside are deemed to be irrelevant. 50 Strangely, a transaction
may be fairly discoverable,
but considered not to be a part of the
"chain of title."5 1 This has lead one commentator to charge that
"the chain of title reasoning is totally impertinent because all trans5
actions relating to the particular tract are readily discoverable. 1
III.

INCONSISTENCIES

IN THE

WITTER OPINION

"Chain of title" was a central issue in Witter.5 3 The Court of
Appeals held:
[C]onsistent with long-standing precedents and property principles,
the Taggarts did not have actual or constructive notice of this restrictive covenant because it was never included in their deed or
direct chain of title. There being no other imputable constructive or
inquiry notice, they are not bound by that covenant."
The issue of notice is central to this analysis. Section 291 of New
48. Cross, supra note 39, at 789. The argument in favor of restrictive notions of chain of
title is that:
The difficulty in discovering all existent restrictive covenants . . .is easily demonstrable. [Charging] purchasers with constructive notice of all that could be discovered by a search of deeds and records, whether within the direct chain of conveyances or outside the direct chain of conveyances. . . [t]herefore [means] that, for
safety's sake, the title examiner must look at each deed of any tract of land of both
immediate and prior grantors that was executed during each one's ownership of the
land in question. Furthermore, beyond requiring the title searcher to go beyond the
index books into the actual deed books to look at deeds conveying lands other than
the lands being searched, the title examiner must read each of these collateral deeds
in detail, not merely their descriptions to find potential latent restrictions, servitudes, or easements imposed in such collateral deeds. When this requirement is considered with the rule existent that deeds are construed as a whole and meaning is
given to every part without reference to formal divisions of the deed, it becomes
obvious that the title searcher is given an entirely impracticable and unreasonable
task.
Stegall v. Robinson, 344 S.E.2d 803, 805-6 (N.C. App. 1986) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
49. Witter, 577 N.E.2d at 340.
50. See id.
51. Cross, supra note 39, at 789.
52. Id. at 799.
53. See Witter v. Taggart, 543 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Witter v. Taggart, 561
N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1990); Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1991).
54. Witter, 577 N.E.2d at 342.
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York's Real Property Law55 does not define "notice," 56 but the
courts, by construction, have made the recording of conveyances notice to subsequent purchasers claiming under the same grantor or
through one who is the common source of title.57
A.

Buffalo Academy

While both Witter's and the Taggarts' titles did devolve from a
common source and the same grantors 5 the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the Taggarts did not have "constructive notice" of
the Witter easement.5 9 The Court of Appeals relied upon the 1935
case of Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Brothers."°
In Buffalo Academy, the defendant had refused to accept from
the plaintiff, as part of an agreed-upon settlement, a deed to a certain piece of property.6" The defendant contended that plaintiff's title
to the property was "unmarketable."'" The title was alleged to be"
unmarketable because the property was encumbered by a restrictive
covenant contained in a deed to a third-party (named Kendall) from
Kendall's and the plaintiff's common grantor, although no mention
had been made of the covenant in plaintiff's deed from the common
grantor.6 3 The restrictive covenant given by the common grantor to
Kendall purportedly prevented a gasoline filling station from being
erected and operated on any of the common grantor's remaining
premises, including that which was eventually devised to the
plaintiff.6 4
The holding of the Buffalo Academy court was that the covenant given by the grantor to Kendall was personal, and did not run
with the grantor's remaining land (including plaintiffis):
[T]he.

.

. covenant is nothing more than an agreement prohibiting

the grantor personally from becoming a competitor of grantee
[Kendall Refining Company] in the filling station business. Nowhere do we find any provision extending such prohibition to the
assigns of the grantor. Thus, the covenant is personal to the grantor
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 1989).
See id.
Tarbell v. West, 86 N.Y. 280, 287-88 (1881).
See supra notes 1-31 and accompanying text.
Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 342 (N.Y. 1991).
196 N.E. 42 (N.Y. 1935).
Buffalo Academy, 196 N.E. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
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and cannot by implication be impressed upon future owners of
other premises.

. .[t]herefore

his obligation under this covenant

stopped at himself and never attached to the lots transferred to the
plaintiff.65
In Witter, to the contrary, the deed itself expressly provided that the
easement did, in fact, "run with the land." 66
1.

Witter's Use Of Buffalo Academy

The court in Buffalo Academy did go on to state that the restrictive covenant was not contained in any deed within the plaintiff's
chain of title, and that absent certain undefined "exceptional circumstances" a purchaser takes with constructive notice from the record
only of encumbrances in his chain of title.67 However, since the decision in Buffalo Academy was premised on the personal nature of the
covenant, the court's further observations constituted only dicta.
Moreover, since the defendant in Buffalo Academy obviously had
actual knowledge of the covenant contained in Kendall's deed, the
Court of Appeal's discourse on constructive notice was not even relevant to the facts of that case. 68 The Buffalo Academy case also did
not involve a covenant or easement contained in the deed severing
the dominant and servient estates. Rather, the common grantor had
previously subdivided a tract of 84 acres into 538 separate and distinct lots pursuant to a filed map.6 9 The lot of Kendall in Buffalo
70
Academy was also geographically remote from the plaintiff's lot.
Since the common grantor's property had already been subdivided,
the deed to Kendall containing the covenant was not itself the instrument of severance of the two geographically distinct lots, and no title
71
relationship was created between the plaintiff's and Kendall's lots.
The Witter action was properly controlled by the 1947 case of Am65. Id. at 44.
66. Record on Appeal at 30, Witter. In Witter, the Court of Appeals stated that the
Howell "deed provided that the covenant expressly ran with the dominant land." Witter, 577
N.E.2d at 339 (emphasis in original). While the Court ultimately attributed no legal significance to this cryptic conclusion, it was, if not mistaken, at best half-true: the language of the
mutual covenants creating the easement provided that they would run not merely with the
dominant land, but with the described "other [servient] lands presently owned by the parties of
the first part, i.e., the common grantors" Record on Appeal at 29-30, Witter.
67. Buffalo Academy, 196 N.E. at 45.
68. See id. at 42.
69. Record on Appeal at 6, Buffalo Academy.
70. Id.
71. See id. 6-7.
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mirati v. Wire Forms, Inc..72
B.

Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc.

In Ammirati, the common grantor's original lot fronted on
Montauk Avenue in Brooklyn. The grantor, in 1926, conveyed part
of the lot (on which was erected premises known as 73 Montauk
Avenue) to plaintiff's predecessor, while retaining the remainder of
the lot (on which was erected premises known as 77 Montauk Avenue).1 3 The deed of severance of the premises provided Ammirati's
predecessor with an easement over a strip of the retained servient
parcel (77 Montauk Avenue) which adjoined the conveyed, dominant parcel (73 Montauk Avenue), "which strip . . . is to be used as
a driveway for egress and ingress for pleasure automobiles to and
from garages to be 'rected' at the rear of the premises." 7
In the twenty-two years following the conveyance, neither the
original grantee nor the grantee's successors (including Ammirati)
ever erected the contemplated garages. To the contrary, Ammirati or
her predecessors affirmatively graded the rear yard of 73 Montauk
Avenue so that it was four to six inches above the grade of the 77
Montauk Avenue property 75 and obstructed the easement by fencing
off the rear yard of 73 Montauk Avenue from the 77 Montauk Ave76
nue driveway.
The servient premises retained by the grantor were subsequently
mortgaged by an instrument which made no reference to the easement.7 7 The mortgage was foreclosed, and no mention of any easement was made in the referee's deed or in any subsequent conveyances, including the eventual conveyance of the servient estate to
Wire Forms Inc. (Wire Forms).7 8 Wire Forms purchased the 77
Montauk Avenue premises knowing that the property could not be
used for its intended business purpose unless access to the driveway
were under the defendant's sole control. 9 When Wire Forms erected
a gate across the driveway, Ammirati brought her easement to Wire
72. 76 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1947), rev'd, 78 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div., 2d Dep't
1948), affid w/o opinion, 298 N.Y. 697 (1948).
73. Record on Appeal at 25, Ammirati.
74. Ammirati, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
75. Record on Appeal at 79, Ammirati.
76. Ammirati, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Record on Appeal at 85, Arnmirati.
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Forms' attention.8 0 Wire Forms rebuffed Ammirati, arguing that
Wire Forms knew nothing of the easement when the property was
purchased, and that if the easement were honored, Wire Forms'
property could not be put to its intended use.8 1 Since Wire Forms
sought to bar Ammirati's access to the easement portion of the serviand owner of
ent premises, Ammirati, as beneficiary of the easement
82
action.
legal
commenced
estate,
the dominant
Ammirati's complaint was originally dismissed based on the
"chain of title" concept that had been articulated in Buffalo Academy. 83 On appeal Ammirati's counsel argued to the Appellate Division that:
Whether the easement deed is or is not in the defendant's chain of
title, and therefore, binds it with notice, is to be determined by two
fundamental interrelated factors. One, is that the source of title is
from the common grantor. The other, is that the plaintiff's and defendant's plots were once one whole plot. The severance created a
title relationship between the two plots. That is, the common grantor actually created the two plots the instant that she severed the
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Ammirati, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 379-80. In her complaint, Ammirati alleged:
Upon information and belief, that all of the deeds and instruments of the grantors
and mortgagors in the chain of title to defendant Wire Forms Inc.'s premises, in
violation of the covenants and declarations of the previous grantor and common
owner in its chain of title, to wit: Rebecca Dasheff, neglected and failed to recite
said easement, as so created and established ....
Record on Appeal at 13-14, Ammirati.
Wire Forms, Inc., in its answer, "admit[ted] that all of the deeds and instruments of the
grantors and mortgagors in defendant's chain of title failed to recite said alleged easement."
Id. at 18.
At trial, the parties in Ammirati specifically stipulated:
It is further stipulated and agreed that by mesne conveyances the premises above
described, as sold to the L.R.S. Building Corp. by Rebecca Dasheff, eventually became the property of the plaintiff in this action. That the parcel which was retained
by said common owner . . .[was] foreclosed and eventually through mesne conveyances became the property of the defendant, the Wire Forms, Inc., who is now the
is stipulated, agreed, and consented to that
holder and owner thereof. . . [and] [i]t
as to the parcel which was retained by Rebecca Dasheff, the common owner, which
was mortgaged and then foreclosed and which parcel eventually became the defendant's parcel from the mesne conveyances, that none of the instruments as well as the
mortgage in that chain of title contained the recitation of the easement ....
id. at 25-6.
83. "[Since] [tihere is no claim of actual notice . . . [i]nthe absence of exceptional
circumstances. . .New York should follow the general well-settled principle that a purchaser
takes notice from the record only of encumbrances in his direct chain of title." Ammirati v.
Wire Forms, Inc., 76 N.Y.S.2d 379, 380-381 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (quoting Buffalo Academy of
the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Brothers, 196 N.E. 42, 45 (N.Y. 1935)).
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whole. By the very nature of the severance, that which was conveyed out (plaintiff's plot) became the determining factor of that
which was retained (defendant's plot). Therefore, the instrument of
severance had to be inspected by an intending prudent purchaser
and that same deed contained
the easement declaration. The de84
fendant therefore had notice
In accepting this argument, the Appellate Division reversed, denied Wire Forms' motion for dismissal, and granted judgment for
Ammirati. 85 The Appellate Division held that "an examination of
the title of defendant Wire Forms Inc.[the servient parcel] would
have disclosed" the existence of the easement.8" The Appellate Division further held that the deed to Ammirati's predecessor "must be
regarded as constructive notice of the easement to defendant Wire
Forms Inc."8 7
Indeed, in her successful brief to the Court of Appeals, Ammirati observed that Wire Forms mistakenly believed the issue to be
whether the defendant (Wire Forms) could be bound by a deed
outside its chain of title, when the issue actually was what was
meant by the term "chain of title":
Various statements appear throughout the defendant's brief that
there is no reference to the easement in the instruments in the
chain of title of the defendant Wire Forms, Inc., and that such is
undisputed. On the contrary, the basic question in this case is the
determination of the defendant's title. 8
Thus, in Ammirati the recorded deed of severance by the common grantor of a dominant estate creating an easement across adjacent retained and previously undivided lands was determined to be a
part of the chain of title of the servient as well as the dominant
84. Brief of Appellant in Appellate Division at 8, Ammirati v. Wire Forms Inc., 273
A.D. 1010, 844 N.Y.S.2d 844 (2d Dep't 1948).
85. Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 78 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Brief of Respondent in Court of Appeals, at 8-9, Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 298
N.Y. 697, 82 N.E. 789 (1948). Ammirati's successful brief went on to state:
[T]he Appellate Division decided when it reversed the trial court, that though the
Rebecca Dasheff [common grantor] deed to the L.R.S. Building Corporation [plaintiff's predecessor] admittedly is a part of plaintiff's chain of title, nevertheless, because of the history of defendant's title, said deed necessarily [also] forms a part of
the decedent's chain of title and is an instrument which had to be examined by the
defendant to properly determine the condition of its title.
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estate. Therefore:
[A]n examination of the title of defendant Wire Forms, Inc., would
have disclosed, in the deed of Rebecca Dashell [the common grantor] to L.R.S. Building Corporation [plaintiff's predecessor], the
creation of the easement in question. The existence upon the record
of this deed containing the easement must be regarded as constructive notice to defendant Wire Forms, Inc.89
1. Why Ammirati Controls Witter
An examination of the Record on Appeal and the trial court
decision in Ammirati confirms Ammirati's applicability to the Witter facts. In the Witter case, as in Ammirati but in contrast to Buffalo Academy, there had been no subdivision into separate lots. 90
The deed to Witter's predecessor was itself the "instrument of severance" separating the plaintiff's (Witter's) land from the remaining
lands which adjoined it.9 These points of distinction from Buffalo
Academy are the very ones urged by counsel for the plaintiff in Ammirati92 and accepted by the Appellate Division there.
2.

How The Court Of Appeals Distinguished Ammirati

The Court of Appeals in Witter attempted to harmonize Ammirati with Buffalo Academy, and to distinguish Ammirati from
Witter by asserting:
Ammirati . . . is readily harmonized with Buffalo Academy's 'exceptional circumstances' qualifying clause . . . . Our affirmance
only of the result reached in Ammirati ... did not alter the general
principles articulated in Buffalo Academy and is readily supportable in view of the sui generis features in Ammirati ... i.e. a landlocked dominant parcel with an affirmative easement by necessity.
The circumstances constituting the 'necessity' ordinarily also constitute inquiry notice of the easement, which limits the common
89. Ammirati, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
90. Compare Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E. 2d 338 (N.Y. 1991) [and] Ammirati v. Wire
Forms, Inc. 76 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1947), rev'd, 78 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div., 2d Dep't
1948), affid w/o opinion, 82 N.E.2d 789 (1948) with Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v.
Boehm Bros., 196 N.E. 42 (N.Y. 1935).
91. Compare Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 76 N.Y.S.2d 379 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947),
rev'd, 78 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1948), aff'd w/o opinion, 82 N.E.2d 789 (1948)
with Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 196 N.E. 42 (N.Y. 1935).
92. See Brief of Appellant in Appellate Division at 11-13, Ammirati v. Wire Forms,
Inc., 78 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1948); Brief of Respondent in Court of Appeals at
12-15, Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 82 N.E.2d 789 (1948).
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grantor servient owner's ability to extinguish the easement. In this
case, the Taggarts did not have inquiry notice of a covenant in the
deed to Witter's fully accessible parcel located across the canal.9"
In fact, the Court of Appeals was wrong on all counts. The
dominant parcel in Ammirati was not landlocked - it was denominated "73 Montauk Avenue," fronted on that Brooklyn street, and
therefore was as "fully accessible" as Witter's property. The easement was merely intended to provide more convenient access to the
rear of the street-front lot. 94 Thus, in Ammirati, there was no "necessity" for the easement.95 Moreover, in the 22 years prior to the
Ammirati trial, not only had the structure to which the easement
was intended to provide access never been erected, but the easement
owner had affirmatively blocked the easement by regrading her land
and erecting an obstructing fence.9 6 Finally, the Witter court noted
that circumstances amounting to necessity will ordinarily constitute
inquiry notice of the easement. Accordingly, the absence of those
circumstances in Ammirati negated any inquiry notice. Even the
original trial court held that "[t]here is no claim of actual notice and
the physical appearance of the property would not indicate usage of
the strip of land by the plaintiff." 97 While imaginative, the rationale
given by the Witter court for refusing to either follow Ammirati or
straight forwardly overrule it, is wholly unsupported. 98
For over forty years, the conflicting holdings of Ammirati and
Buffalo Academy existed without clashing. These cases finally col93. Witter, 477 N.E.2d at 341-342.
94. Ammirati, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
95. As that term necessity had previously been understood under New York law; see
infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
96. Record on Appeal at 79, Ammirati; Ammirati, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
97. Ammirati, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
98. In support of its restrictive interpretation of Ammirati, the Court of Appeals cited 3
RICHARD R.B. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1991). Witter v. Taggart, 577

N.E.2d 338, 341 (N.Y. 1991). In fact, Powell reads Ammirati in a manner at odds with the
Witter court's revisionist recreation of that case:
Some jurisdictions, such as New York, do not charge subsequent purchasers with
notice of covenants and restrictions found in deeds to other properties coming out of
the common grantor. But see Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 273 A.D. 1010, 78
N.Y.S.2d 844 (2d Dep't), aff'd w/o opinion, 298 N.Y. 697, 82 N.E.2d 789 (1948),
for an indication that this rule may not be applied with respect to easements over
the land retained by the grantor which appeared in the recorded deed of the land
conveyed. A purchaser of the land retained may be required to read other deeds out
of the common grantor, which are not in the direct chain of title, to ascertain
whether these deeds contain any easements over the land retained.
3 RICHARD R.B. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, T424, at 34-271, note 11 (1991).
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lided in Witter.99 Though decided over a decade after Buffalo Academy,' the sensible approach to the "chain of title" issue discussed
in Ammirati was disregarded by the Court of Appeals in Witter.10°
It has been previously noted that the "chain of title" concept is
highly abstract and has led to many problems.1 02 This thesis is important when analyzing Ammirati. Ammirati recognized that grants
from common plots of land may be within each other's "chain of
'1 0 3
title.
IV.

VARYING NOTIONS OF "CHAIN OF TITLE"

The principle enunciated in Ammirati was, until Witter, consistently applied in New York and elsewhere. In Long Building, Inc. v.
Brookrnill Corp.,0 4 the Record on Appeal reveals that the servient
and dominant estates had previously been held by a single owner as
part of an "entire tract."' 1 5 One parcel was conveyed to Elnora Realty Corp. by way of a deed which created an easement across the
retained adjacent land. 0 6 The dominant parcel was later conveyed
by Elnora to the defendant Brookmill Corp.'0 7 The retained land was
conveyed to Long Building, Inc., with no mention of the easement. 0 8
As owner of the servient parcel, Long Building, Inc., brought an action to extinguish the easement. The Appellate Division, in refusing
plaintiff's request, cited Ammirati and held that "[tihe recording of
the deed which created the easement of a right of way over the grantor's remaining adjacent land constituted constructive notice to
plaintiff when it later took title to the servient parcel from the same
grantor."' 0 9
The Appellate Division, First Department in Holt v. Fleisch99. Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 341-342 (N.Y. 1991).
100. Compare, Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 76 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup.Ct. 1947), rev'd,
78 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1948), affid w/o opinion, 298 N.Y. 697 (1948) with
Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 196 N.E. 42 (N.Y. 1935).
101. Witter, 577 N.E.2d at 341-342.
102. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
103. See Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 78 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (App. Div., 2d Dep't
1948).
104. 95 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1950).
105. Record on Appeal at 11-13, Long Building, Inc. v. Brookmill Corp.
106.
Id. at 18-19.
107.
Id.
108.
Id. at 22-23.
109. Long Building, Inc., 95 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1950) (citing Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 78 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. App. Div.), aftd, 82 N.E.2d 789 (N.Y.
1948)).
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mann,110 while enforcing an easement of light and air over the defendant's premises, held:
In examining the title it was to be found that in 1866 Ann Bushnell, the owner of the whole tract, conveyed a portion of it, retaining another portion for herself. Her deed to Holt was recorded and
contained the covenant which restricted the portion of land retained by her. Thus there was placed on record a deed which separated her ownership of the whole tract, and which deed, had it
been inspected, would have at once disclosed the fact that the
premises retained by Ann Bushnell were burdened with the easement in favor of her grantee.'1 '
The Ammirati doctrine or an even broader pro-notice rule is
generally the rule in other states:
It is ordinarily held that if a deed or a contract for the conveyance
of one parcel of land with a covenant or easement affecting another
parcel of land owned by the same grantor is duly recorded, the
110. 78 N.Y.S. 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902).
111. Id. at 651 (emphasis added). Holt was expressly distinguished by the Court of
Appeals in Buffalo Academy, albeit for reasons different from those later found applicable in
Ammirati. In Holt, the restriction sought to be.enforced was a front line for adjacent houses.
The Court in Buffalo Academy stated:
Any one building in a residential section who projects his house farther into the
street line than the adjacent house might be said to be put on notice as to whether
he is restricted from so doing, either by a general plan of building or by some right
or easement which his adjacent neighbor may have acquired.
Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 196 N.E. 42, 45 (N.Y. 1935). See e.g.,
Simmons v. Crisfield, 90 N.E. 956 (N.Y. 1910) (an executor transferred land owned by the
decedent's estate pursuant to a deed creating an easement over adjoining lands, and then sold
the adjoining lands by a deed containing no mention of the easement, but the purchaser of the
servient parcel was nonetheless bound); Spencer v. Lighthouse, 99 N.Y.S. 1015 (App. Div.,
4th Dep't 1906); Whistler v Cole, 143 N.Y.S. 478 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga Co. 1913), affid on op.
below, 146 N.Y.S. 1118 (App. Div., 3d Dep't 1914). In Whistler, the trial term Justice (in an
opinion adopted by the Appellate Division) held:
It is true that the covenant does not appear directly in the chain of title of the
defendant's lot . . . . Reasonable prudence would require of the defendant, when
about to purchase this lot, to examine the conveyances made by his grantor, Elizabeth P. Ladow, during the time she owned the lot which she was about to convey to
him, to determine whether or not there had been any conveyances by her of the lot,
or any part thereof, she was about to convey to him. An examination of the record
would have disclosed that, in April of the same year, his vendor had conveyed to
these plaintiffs the adjoining lot and in the conveyance of said adjoining lot is the
covenant in question .... I conclude, therefore, that the defendant was chargeable
with notice of this covenant and is bound by its terms; that the covenant was intended as a restriction upon the adjoining lot for the benefit of this property and for
enhancing its value; and that, from a violation of this covenant, the defendant may
be enjoined.
Whistler, 143 N.Y.S. at 480 (emphasis added).
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record is constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the other
parcel. " '
It has also been stated that:
The weight of authority is to the effect that if a deed or a contract
for the conveyance of one parcel of land, with a covenant or easement affecting another parcel of land owned by the same grantor,
is duly recorded, the record is constructive notice to a subsequent
purchaser of the latter parcel. " 3
In the Vermont case of Moore v. Center,"4 the plaintiffs instituted an action for injunctive relief to protect an easement in lands
of the defendant." 5 The plaintiffs owned an island, and wished to
have convenient access to it via a particular shoreline." 6 In order to
facilitate this wish, they obtained, by recorded deed from the grantor, fee title to an access strip leading from a nearby highway to the
lake's low water mark. " 7 The recorded deed, which severed the access strip from other lands of the grantor, also granted to the plaintiffs an easement to park their automobile in an area adjoining the
access strip." 8 The common grantor thereafter died, and his widow
conveyed the remaining portion of his lands to the defendant." 9 The
defendant erected a garage, driveway and retaining wall on the site
of the parking easement, and prohibited the plaintiffs from further
parking their automobile on his lands and premises. 12 0
The lower court concluded that the defendant had no actual or
constructive notice of the plaintiffs' easement, and consequently dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. 2 ' The Supreme Court of Vermont
reversed, holding:
112. 66 AM. JUR. 2d Records and Recording Laws §120 (1973) (footnote omitted). For
example, "[siuppose A, owning lots x and y, conveys lot x to B who records the deed containing a restriction on lot y for the benefit of x. Subsequently A conveys lot y to C, and the deed
makes no reference to the restriction. By the majority rule, the record of the deed of lot x
containing the restriction upon lot y gives constructive notice to a purchaser of lot y." V.M.
Fry, Note, Title Search in Virginia, 26 VA. L. REV. 385, 391 (1940).
113. Annotation, Record of Deed or Contractfor Conveyance of One Parcel with Covenant or Easement Affecting Another Parcel Owned by Grantoras Constructive Notice to Subsequent Purchaser or Encumbrancer of Latter Parcel, 16 A.L.R. 1013 (1922).
114. 204 A.2d 164 (Vt. 1964).
115. Id. at 165.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 166.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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[The defendant] contends the plaintiffs' easement was extinguished
since he purchased the property in 1950 without notice. He argues
that the plaintiffs' grant concerns other lands of the common grantors which are outside his chain of title, and the recording of the
deed of July 13, 1949 is not constructive notice of the easement
created in that instrument. [This] argument is unsound. It is based
on the erroneous notion that since the title to the fee of the dominant estate is not a part of the defendant's tract, the easement cre122
ated in favor of that estate is outside the defendant's line.
In the North Carolina case of Reed v. Elmore,'2 3 the common
grantor owned a tract of land containing 154 acres.12 4 She deeded
one portion to the plaintiff.1 25 The deed contained a covenant prohibiting the erection of any building on a certain portion of both the
land deeded to the plaintiff, and the land retained by the grantor.12
The grantor subsequently deeded the land covered by the restriction
to a purchaser. 27 The deed to the purchaser contained no restrictions and made no reference to the common grantor's deed to the
plaintiff.1 2 8 The purchaser thereafter conveyed the servient premises
and by mesne conveyances it came into the hands of defendants. 2 9
None of the mesne conveyances contained any restriction or made
any reference to the deed to plaintiff. 13 0 The defendants then caused
the property acquired by them, including the portion lying within the
restricted area, to be divided into residential building lots. 13' The
plaintiff commenced an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. 3 2 The Supreme Court of North Carolina, affirming the trial
and intermediate appellate courts, sustained a judgment in favor of
plaintiff. 33
122. Id. at 167.
123. 98 S.E.2d 360 (N.C. 1957).
124. Id. at 361.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The term "mesne conveyances" refers to "intermediate conveyance[s] ...that
occupy. . .an intermediate position in a chain of title between the first grantee and the present
holder." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 333 (6th ed. 1990).
130. Reed, 204 A.2d at 361.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 368. The Court's reasoning was elaborated on in a concurring opinion which
held:
A, the owner of a certain land, be it a 200-foot lot or a 10-acre tract, decides to sell
a portion thereof, e.g., one-half to B. A's deed to B sets forth explicitly their agree-
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In Stegall v. Robinson,'34 North Carolina's intermediate appellate court in explaining the Reed rule, held that:
Simply stated Reed stands for the rule that in title examination
when checking the grantor's out conveyances it is not enough to
merely ensure that the subject property was not conveyed out previously. The title examiner must read the prior conveyances to determine that they do not contain restrictions applicable to the use
of the subject property. 35
In the Virginia case of Corbett v. Ruben,' the owners of one
parcel (parcel No. 1) granted the owner of another parcel (parcel
No. 2) an easement for the off-street parking of seven automobiles
on parcel No. 1, for the use and benefit of the owner and occupants
of apartments located on parcel No. 2.1 In an action brought by a
successor owner of parcel No. 1 to "clear title," the Supreme Court
of Virginia held, "the title Corbett [i.e., the owner of parcel No. 1]
acquired was burdened by the easement, an encumbrance he acment, to wit, the imposition of identical restrictive covenants on the portion thereof
conveyed to B and on the portion thereof retained by A. The restrictive covenants do
not purport to affect any land other than said 200-foot lot of 10-acre tract. Only A
and B, and their respective heirs and assigns, are bound by said mutual restrictive
covenants. The deed from A to B is duly recorded. Hence, a subsequent purchaser
from A of the portion of said lot or tract retained by A is charged with notice that
A has imposed upon it said restrictive covenants.
Id. (Bobbitt, J. concurring).
The concurrence further recommended that flexible, and fact-specific approach to this
issue:
In one sense, when A conveys the retained portion of said lot or tract to a subsequent purchaser, A's deed to B is not in such purchaser's chain of title, that is, A's
deed to B is not the source of or a link in such purchaser's title. But in another
sense, A's deed to B is in the purchaser's chain of title, that is, such subsequent
purchaser is charged with notice of such recorded deed in like manner as he would
be charged with notice of a recorded deed of trust, judgment or other record lien
imposed during the period of A's ownership. Thus, such purchaser's title, while it
does not pass under A's deed to B, is limited by the terms of A's deed to B whereby
the restrictive covenants are imposed. The sense in which the expression 'chain of
title' is used in decided cases must be considered in the light of the facts of each
case and in relation to the context in which it is used.
Id. (Bobbitt, J. concurring).
134. 344 SE.2d 803 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 347 S.E.2d 456 (1986).
135. Id. at 805. This opinion noted that the Reed holding is highly controversial. Id. at
805-6. It also noted that while there have been attempts to draft legislation that would overrule Reed, such proposed legislation has not been enacted and recognized that Reed still controlled. Id.
136. 290 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 1982).
137. Id. at 848.
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cepted with constructive, if not actual, notice." 138
In Pusey v. Clayton,"a9 the plaintiff received from a common
grantor a deed to property which severed the demised property from
adjoining retained land of the grantor, and which created an easement over the retained servient parcel. 4 The retained servient parcel was subsequently conveyed by instrument which made no mention of the easement, and the property was then re-conveyed to the
defendant by a deed which also did not mention the easement.14
The Court of Chancery of Delaware held that the defendant nevertheless had constructive notice of the easement:
[T]he uncontroverted facts and circumstances present here [show]
that Clayton is bound by the grant of the easement because it was
granted by his predecessor-grantor after that grantor acquired title
and before the conveyance to the predecessor of Clayton. That is
one of the purposes for a search of the Grantor Indices in a title
search and it is not unreasonable under the facts present here to
impose on Clayton the duty to have examined the conveyance from
Dolan [i.e., the common grantor] to Pappas [i.e., the plaintiff] to
142
see if it affected his title.
V.

ANALYZING WITTER IN LIGHT OF "PRACTICAL EXIGENCIES"
OF SEARCHING TITLE

Thus, as detailed above, the various states have defined differently the necessary scope of a title examination, from North Carolina which requires that all deeds out from a common grantor be
read in full 1 43 , to New York, which, after Witter, holds that such
deeds may be wholly ignored. 44 Ammirati articulated a middle
ground based upon the contiguity of the premises involved and the
fact of the easement's having been contained in a deed of severance.
The Buffalo Academy rule "represented a pragmatic judicial response to the exigencies of conducting a title search" under a gran-,
tor-grantee title indexing system. 145 An examination of those exigencies reveals that the balance struck by Ammirati between the
purpose of the recording system to protect existing recorded inter138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 850.
1986 WL 2636 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 1986).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See supra notes 123-142 and accompanying text.
Id.
Andy Assocs., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 399 N.E.2d 1160, 1166 (N.Y. 1979).
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ests, and the countervailing desire by the courts to relieve title
searchers of onerous requirements, was a wise one.
A title searcher in Suffolk County is required to examine every
deed "out" from grantors in a prospective purchaser's chain of title
during the period within which that grantor held title to the premises
subject to the search.146 Thus, if the Taggarts' title searcher had
done a proper job, the deed creating the Witter easement must have
been discovered at some point during that search. The only policy
issue properly before the Witter court was what level of scrutiny
must be given to each of the deeds a title searcher obtains and examines and having taken the deed creating the Witter easement into his
hands, whether the title searcher was bound to read and review the
easement language.
A.

Policy Behind Recording Acts

In Jackson v. Post,1 47 it was held that "[t]he object of the recording acts is to prevent frauds - to prevent the person having title
to land from selling it more than once, and thereby defrauding one
or more of the purchasers." 148 In Suffolk County, a title searcher
therefore must physically review all deeds out by the grantor of the
premises during the period said grantor held title to those premises.
This is because the Suffolk County grantor-grantee indexes have historically contained, for each transaction listed, only the names of the
grantor and the grantee, the liber and page at which the actual deed
resides, and the date of the transaction. No other identification or
description of the property has been provided. 4 9
146. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 1989); infra note 149 and accompanying text.
147. 15 Wend. 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836).
148. Id. at 594.
149. The Suffolk County Administrative Code has, since 1979, called for the endorsement of block and lot numbers upon instruments presented for filing. SUFFOLK COUNTY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § A18-3. Those numbers are reflected in the grantor-grantee index of
those instruments as well. Id. However, the deed containing the Witter easement was made
and recorded in 1951. At present § 316-a of the New York Real Property Law provides that
all real estate transactions must be recorded:
Every instrument affecting real estate or chattels real, situated in the county of
Suffolk, which shall be, or which shall have been recorded in the office of the clerk
of said county on and after the first day of January, nineteen hundred fifty-one,
shall be recorded and indexed pursuant to the provisions of this act.
N.Y. REAL. PROP. LAW § 316-a(l) (McKinney 1989).
Moreover, this section provides that the official records are the grantor-grantee lists:
For the purposes of indexing under the provisions of this act all conveyances, mortgages, or other instruments recorded and indexed or reindexed under the provisions
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Thus, if a grantor took title to subject premises in 1950, and
conveyed the premises in 1957, a title searcher would have to examine each conveyance in which the grantor is listed as "grantor"
between 1950 and 1957 in order to ensure that the grantor had not
conveyed to another, whose title would have priority, an interest in
the identical premises.
In addressing this issue, it is-essential to note that the number
of deeds out from a grantor which the title searcher must review is
limited, thereby ameliorating the burden on the title searcher since
the Suffolk county grantor-grantee indexes are not county-wide in
scope but are, rather, organized by township.150 One searching title
for property (such as the Taggarts') in the Town of Islip thus need
not (unless the property straddles a town line) search for any deeds
"out" from the grantor in the books of record for any other
township.
In order to make the determination that an interest in the property whose title is being examined has not been "sold twice," the
title searcher must review the metes and bounds description of the
premises in each of the grantor's conveyances listed in the particular
township's index during the period.1 5' This search ensures that all or
a part of the premises sought to be purchased by the prospective
purchaser were not included in such a conveyance. 52 Ammirati, until Witter, had stood for the proposition that a title searcher is put on
notice if after a review of the metes and bounds description in one of
grantor's "deeds out" it is revealed that the deed out severed adjacent property from a larger freehold of which the premises whose
of this act shall be so indexed or reindexed under the proper town book of index
indicated in the description hereinbefore provided for, and in an order and sequence
known as the 'first letter of the last name and first letter of the first name method'.
The corporate names shall be indexed under the first letter of the first substantive
word of the name of the corporation, or in the event of a corporation using the
proper name of an individual, such as John Smith, Inc., such index shall be under
Smith, John, Inc., as well as John Smith, Inc.
Id. § 316-a(7).
Title searchers in Suffolk County thus still search the official grantor-grantee records, and
use the unofficial tax map designations as a "back-up" only. Since no tax map designations
were required until 1979, they are not available for searches that proceed farther back than
1979.
150. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 316-a(2) (McKinney 1989).
151. The metes and bounds description of a piece of real estate refers to the "boundary
lines of land, with their terminal points and angles." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 991 (6th ed.
1990). This term is used as "[a] way of describing land by listing the compass directions and
distances by listing the compass directions and distances of the boundaries." Id.
152. Id.
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title the searcher is examining formed another part. 1 3 Accordingly,
the title searcher, perceiving a "title link" between the two premises
1 54
had to go further and review the contents of the entire deed.
Ammirati, therefore, neither imposed upon the title searcher the
obligation to actually read the entire deed out from grantors in the
chain of title, nor did it unnecessarily exalt the convenience of the
title searcher above protected property interests. Rather, it protected
the legitimate, properly recorded interests which adjoining landowners may have obtained from a common grantor rather than sacrificing those interests in order to minimally reduce the extent of the
search a title searcher must perform. In effect, it drew a middle line
between the North Carolina rule of Reed 65 and the now-adopted

Witter 156 rule.
If the Taggarts' title company, neglecting to perceive or guide
their title search by the previously established Ammirati rule, failed

to uncover the Witter easement, presumably "[tihe loss [if any]
should fall where it belongs-on a negligent title company. ' 67 New
York courts would thus not be put in the position of perpetrating an
injustice and then lamenting, as did the trial court in Ammirati:
"[w]hat action an owner of a dominant estate should take to protect
his easement where similar facts exist I do not know. 1 58 A restric-

tive list of recordable instruments is unjust "[i]f the recording system has a purpose to protect existing positions as well as the positions those who claim to be innocent purchasers think they achieve.
153. Compare Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 78 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (App. Div. 1948)
("[tIhe existence upon the record of this deed containing the easement must be regarded as
constructive notice to defendant Wire Forms, Inc.") with Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338,
342 (N.Y. 1991) ("to the extent that the Appellate Division Memorandum in Ammirati may
be read inconsistently with Buffalo Academy . . .we add that it [Ammirati] should not be
followed") (emphasis in original).
154. This would only be done in those cases in which a "title link" was perceived. Ordinarily, a title searcher was not required to go beyond the metes and bounds description in
scrutinizing a deed out from a common grantor.
155. See supra notes 123-142 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
157. Goldstein v. Gold, 483 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1984). The Taggarts' title company, in fact, never claimed not to have reviewed the language of the Witter
easement. The Taggarts' title company claimed only that the Witter easement was covered by
an "exception" to the Taggarts' title policy. Record on Appeal at 262 note 1, Witter.
158. Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 76 N.Y.S.2d 379, 380-381 (Sup. Ct. 1947). See
e.g., Harry M. Cross, Weaknesses of the Present Recording System, 47 IOwA L. REV. 245
(1962)(describing the problems that will occur from relegating recorded conveyances to an
"unrecorded" status merely because they are considered to be out of a rigid definition of
"chain of title") [hereinafter Iowa].
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..- Yet, this is the precise effect of Witter: Easements contained
in deeds of severance have been rendered effectively "unrecordable"
(since their recording has been held not to operate so as to give constructive notice to a purchaser of the servient estate) and thus illusory. Such a result is inconsistent with the Recording Act's purpose
"to protect existing positions."' 8 0
In Witter, the Court of Appeals' misunderstanding of Ammirati
may in part be the result of the brevity of the language of the Ammirati opinion itself. The specific facts of the dispute in Ammirati
were only explicitly detailed in the original lower court decision.''
The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed that deci63
and specifically limited Buffalo Academy to its facts.
sion,'
Taken in the context of the lower court decision and the briefs on
appeal, 164 the Ammirati holding is clear. However, the Appellate
Division, Second Department's decision did not systematically address all of these issues.' 5 Instead, it held only that "[f]indings of
fact and conclusions of law inconsistent herewith are reversed and
new findings and conclusions will be made."' 6 6
VI.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Ammirati's true holding may also have been misunderstood because the Court of Appeals in Ammirati, although affirming the decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department, 6 7 did so without issuing an opinion. 6 8 In New York, affirmance without opinion
by the Court of Appeals is a procedural loophole that in effect leaves
159. Cross, supra note 158, at 250.
160. Id. at 250. See also Fryer v. Rockefeller, 63 N.Y. 268, 274 (1875) ("The benefit of
the recording of a deed is, that it thus becomes a defense against a subsequent purchaser
bonafide."); Foss v. Riordan, 84 N.Y.S.2d 224, 233 (Sup. Ct. 1947), afd 79 N.Y.S.2d 514
(App. Div., 2d Dep't. 1948), appeal dismissed, 80 N.E.2d 658 (1948) (stating that "[tihe
recording of [an] instrument [is] constructive notice to the world of the contents thereof").
161. Ammirati, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 379-380.
162. Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 78 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (App. Div. 1948).
163. The case of Buffalo Acad[emy] . . . is inapplicable . . . [i]t deals only with a
covenant imposing building restrictions upon the use to which property may be put ... [sluch
restrictions are not analogous to an easement ...[t]hat case, therefore, must be confined to its
own facts." Id.
164. See supra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
165. Compare Brief on Appeal at 8, Ammirati, with Ammirati, 78 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845
(App. Div. 1948).
166. Ammirati, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
167. Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 82 N.E. 789 (N.Y. 1948).
168. Id.
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open the question of just what was actually affirmed. 169 Thus, although a review of the Record leaves no doubt as to the import of
Ammirati, the opinion's procedural posture left the Ammirati holding ripe for the extensive revisionism that occurred in the Witter
opinion.' °
VII.

EASEMENT

BY

NECESSITY

While the Witters fought for what the Court of Appeals categorized as a scenic easement, 71 . the Court of Appeals distinguished
Witter from Arnmirati by categorizing the latter as a case involving
an "easement by necessity". 72 This rationale has unduly expanded
the concept of "easement by necessity." "Necessity" has historically
been viewed in New York as one element required for the implication of an easement. In order to establish an "easement by
necessity":
[P]laintiffs must prove: (1) that the properties that presently are in
separate ownership must formerly have been in undivided ownership; (2) that prior to the separation of title, the use giving rise to
the claimed easement 'shall have been so long continued and so
obvious and manifest as to show that it was meant to be permanent'; (3) the use must be plainly and physically apparent on reasonable inspection; and (4) that the easement is necessary to the
beneficial enjoyment of the land granted or retained. 7
Some courts have recognized the existence of an easement by
necessity even in the absence of those two middle elements, but this
has classically been done only in the case of a "landlocked" parcel.
As held by the Appellate Division in Carlo v. Lushia: 74
A way of necessity arises where there is a conveyance of a part of a
169. Palmer v. Travis, 119 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1918).
170. Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 341-342 (N.Y. 1991). Possibly, Ammirati had
no opinion in order to save time on paperwork for the Court. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. §
5522 (McKinney 1992) (commentary at § 5522:3). While conserving court resources is a lofty
goal, correctly construing precedent should take priority. Of what value are precedents whose
true meaning can be obliterated merely because of vague language and the passage of time?
171. Witter, 577 N.E.2d at 339.
172. Our affirmance of only the result reached in Ammirati ...did not alter the general
principles articulated in Buffalo Academy and is readily supportable in view of the sui generis
features in Ammirati ...i.e., a landlocked dominant parcel with an affirmative EASEMENT BY
NECESSITY." Id. at 342 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
173.

2 WILLIAM X. REED, WARREN'S WEED ON THE NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROP-

ERTY, §6.01, at 36-EASE (Oscar L. Warren ed., 4th ed. rev'd 1990) (citations omitted).
174. 534 N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div., 3d Dep't 1988).
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tract of land of such nature and extent that either the part conveyed or the part retained is "landlocked"; that is, it is entirely
surrounded by the land from which it is severed, or by this land
and the land of strangers. 75
Implied easements are not favored by the law and the burden of
proof rests with defendant to prove such entitlement by clear and
convincing evidence.176 The person seeking to establish the existence
of the easement must show that it is reasonably necessary for the
beneficial enjoyment of the property, and not a "mere convenience."' 7 7 Indeed, it has even recently been held that "[aibsolute
necessity is the standard for a finding of an easement by
78
necessity.'
In Ammirati, it could at best be said that what was at issue was
garage access, not access to the property as a whole or the dwelling
thereon. 1 9 Moreover, the garage was never erected, and the property
was altered by fencing and grading to render a garage use impossible. It has been held that "an implied easement by necessity is extinguished when the necessity ceases.

'

180

Finally, even if a garage had been built, the courts in New
York, in construing whether "necessity" exists, have determined that
alternative access, even if achievable only at great expense to the
alleged dominant property owner, will obviate the requisite "necessity." Thus, for instance, in Abbott v. Herring,' the court rejected
175. Id. at 525 (citing JOSEPH RASCH, NEW YORK LAW AND PRACTICE OF REAL PROP§750, at 466-467 (1962) (construing Palmer v. Palmer, 44 N.E. 966, 967 (N.Y. 1896)).
176. Hedden v. Bohling, 490 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (App. Div., 4th Dep't 1985); see also 2
WILLIAM X. REED, WARREN'S WEED ON THE NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §6.01, at
36-EASE (Oscar L. Warren ed., 4th ed. rev'd 1990).
177. Hedden, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 392; see also Abbott v. Herring, 469 N.Y.S.2d 268 (3d
Dep't 1983), affid, 479 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1984).
178. Van Schaack v. Torsoe, 555 N.Y.S.2d 836, 837 (2d Dep't 1988)(refusing to find
easement over neighbor's driveway where plaintiffs' lot fronted on a public road, and holding
that the fact "[t]hat the construction of a driveway from the plaintiffs' residence out to this
road may be costly or inconvenient is not relevant").
179. Cf. Fink v. Friedman, 358 N.Y.S.2d 250, 256 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
180. Fischer v. Liebman, 524 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1988). Commentators have further stated that:
Strict attention to the uses of the claiming dominant parcel contemplated by the
parties at the time of the severance of the original unity of ownership is not desirable. To the extent that easements by necessity rest on the 'operation of law' for the
realization of the social objective of full land utilization, the easement by necessity
must be flexibly adaptable to the well-known likelihood of changing property uses.
3 RICHARD R.B. POWELL. THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1410, at 34-80, note 35 (rev. ed.
1991). See also Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N.Y. 139 (1896).
181. 469 N.Y.S.2d 268 (3d Dep't 1983), affd, 479 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1984).
ERTY
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the creation of an easement by necessity to allow the plaintiff to utilize a driveway for vehicular access to her dwelling, notwithstanding
that the terrain made the driveway over which she sought an easement the only means of vehicular access, since the plaintiff had the
option of parking in a garage located on a different portion of her
property and then proceeding to the dwelling via a footpath. 18 2 Similarly, in Ammirati, even if vehicular access to the rear of Mrs. Ammirati's property was theoretically possible only via the easement
driveway between the properties, Mrs. Ammirati had the option of
parking on the street (in front of or near her home) and walking to
73 Montauk Avenue. 183
In Fink v. Friedman, 184 the plaintiff's garage was situated in
such a manner that it could not be entered other than by crossing
over the defendant's driveway. 18 5 Rejecting the implication of an
easement across defendant's driveway, the court held:
[T]here is a doctrine that a right of way may be formed if the use
is strictly necessary, and without any alternative, for the proper
enjoyment of the burdening parcel. The Finks do not pass the severe test, since, theoretically, their house could be moved a few feet
south or east to provide garage access.1 86
In Miller v. Edmore Homes Corporation,8 7 the owners of a row of
attached homes with garages at their rear and a common driveway
leading from the garages to the main road, claimed that the driveway was too narrow to allow use of the garages unless its width was
deemed expanded by the implication of a several foot easement by
necessity across the lot just beyond the common driveway. 188 The
Appellate Division, reversing the judgment of the trial court, refused
to imply the existence of such as easement, holding:
The undisputed evidence established that, by relocation of the garages closer to the dwellings or by alteration of the garages in their
present locations, ample space could be afforded between the garages and respondents' rear lot line to permit automobiles to be
182. Id. at 270.
183. See Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 76 N.Y.2d 379 (App. Div. 1947).
184. 358 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
185. Id. at 253.
186. Id. at 256 (citing Heyman v. Biggs, 119 N.E. 243, 245 (1918); In re Avenue K,
Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York, 293 N.Y.S. 1017, 1019 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1937)
aff'd 10 N.E.2d 520 (1937).
187. 137 N.Y.S.2d 324 (App. Div., 2d Dep't. 1955).
188. Id. at 325.
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turned into and out of the garages, all within respondents' own lots.
The fact that such relocation or alteration would entail monetary
expenditure or result in diminution in value of respondents' properties is irrelevant. 189
The Witter court, in effect has revised the Ammirati holding. In
Ammirati no vehicular use of the rear yard had ever been made and
no claim of "necessity" was ever advanced by either party.190 The
Court of Appeals in Witter has drastically expanded the concept of
"easement by necessity" by suggesting that even theoretical vehicular access to one's fenced-off rear yard garden is so crucial as to give
rise to an easement by necessity over an adjoining driveway. 91 Indeed, although the Court of Appeals pays lip service in the Witter
opinion to the adage that covenants restricting use will be strictly
construed because "the law has long favored free and unencumbered
use of real property,"1 92 the court's expansion of the concept of easement by necessity flies directly in the fact of that principle. To reach
its desired result in Witter, the court had to extensively revise precedent. While the exact facts of Witter are unlikely to reoccur, the
court has opened a Pandora's box with respect to cases likely to appear with relative frequency.
A.

The Covenant-Easement Distinction

A distinction between various categories of restriction based
upon their legal characterization rather than the ability of a title
searcher to locate them would appear illogical, since the rules regarding "chain of title" are based upon "the exigencies of conducting a title search" under a grantor-grantee title indexing system.193 The Witter court in fact rejected such a distinction and
overruled Ammirati to the extent it held to the contrary.1 94 However,
the Witter court also paradoxically appeared to rely on the distinction between an affirmative easement and a negative easement as a
basis for distinguishing Ammirati (affirmative easement) and Witter
(negative easement).1 95 The court further asserted, ipse dixit, that
189. Id. at 327; see also Van Schaack v. Torsoe, 555 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (App. Div., 2d
Dep't. 1990).
190. See Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 341-42 (N.Y. 1991).
191. See id.
192. Id. at 340.
193. Andy Assocs. Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 399 N.E.2d 1160 (N.Y. 1979).
194. Witter, 577 N.E.2d at 342.
195. See id.
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the term "negative easement" is identical to and interchangeable

with the term "restrictive covenant."

196

All easements restrict the use to which the servient parcel may
be put; an easement of ingress and egress, for instance, prevents the
erection upon the servient parcel of any structure which might interfere with such use. Thus, the fact that in the Witter case the Taggarts' use of their property was "restricted" is not determinative of
whether what is involved may be categorized as an "easement."
Since easements classically involve adjoining pieces of land, 19'
this provided the logical connection between Ammirati's limitation
of the Buffalo Academy rule to encumbrances other than easements,
and Ammirati's prime holding, that deeds of severance of adjoining
properties form part of the chain of title of both the dominant and
servient parcels. 198
Easements also protect affirmative rights of the easement owner.
The covenants in Buffalo Academy which the Appellate Division in
Ammirati found were "not analogous to an easement,"199 were
merely personal promises not to build or operate a gas station, made
by the grantor to a third party grantee of premises geographically
remote from those of the defendant.2 0 The deed at issue in the Witter case, in contrast, involved two adjoining pieces of property and
was expressly designed to protect Witter's affirmative right to an un196. Id.
197. "An 'easement,' in the proper sense of the word, can only exist in respect of two
adjoining pieces of land occupied by different persons, and can only impose a negative duty on
the owner of the servient tenement." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 510 (6th ed. 1990); see, e.g.,
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNA-

715 (1986) ("[a] prescription that is held by one person in land owned by another
and that entitles its holder to a specific limited use or enjoyment (as the right to cross the land
or to have a view continue unobstructed over it) ...." (emphasis added)); Town of Southampton v. Jessup, 56 N.E. 538, 539 (N.Y. 1900) (citing Long Island R.R. v. Garvey, 54 N.E.
60, 61 (N.Y. 1899)) ("[a]n easement is a permanent right conferred by grant or prescription,
authorizing one landowner to do or maintain something on the adjoining land of another
BRIDGED

....11)
198. Although not directly attributing any legal significance to the fact, the Witter court
appeared to rest its distinction between the Ammirati and Witter cases in part on the issue of
proximity. Witter, 577 N.E.2d at 342. The Witter court first stated that Ammirati involved
adjoining retained land. Id. Yet it subsequently observed that Witter's parcel was located
across a canal from the Taggarts' property. Id. at 343. In fact, the Witter record reveals that
the retained servient parcel from which Witter's dominant parcel was severed adjoined Witter's parcel at "the center line of the canal." Record on Appeal at 36, Witter.
199. Witter, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
200. The Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., Inc., 196 N.E.-42, 44
(N.Y. 1935).
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obstructed view.2 0 Such a right was previously classified as an easeCourt of Appeals and all the other applicable
ment by the
22
authorities.

Professors Bruce and Ely have observed that "[sleveral important legal ramifications flow from" the distinction between easements
and restrictive covenants.2 03 They state that what they refer to as
"negative easements" usually concern light and view, 20 4 even while
pointing out that the distinction between a "negative easement" and
an "affirmative easement" is sometimes simply a matter of
perspective:
An easement may contain both affirmative and negative features.
Hence, language that the parties 'shall have the right jointly to use
and enjoy said land' but that 'neither may erect any fence or structure

. . .

which will interfere with the light and air' has been found

to include affirmative and negative aspects. It is affirmative in perIt is negative in
mitting enjoyment of the servient tenement.
205
prohibiting restriction of light and air.

Similarly, an easement of unobstructed view is "negative" in prohibiting obstruction of the view, and "affirmative" in permitting enjoyment of the view by the easement owner.
Professors Bruce and Ely posit a rule for making what they nevertheless categorize as the "legally important distinction" between
negative easements and restrictive covenants. This rule unmistakably
requires the characterization of the Witter easement as an
"easement":
The following rule of thumb may be helpful in distinguishing between these two interests. If the owner of the burdened land is prohibited from using his entire parcel for a certain purpose, such as
commercial use, then the interest is probably a restrictive covenant.
If, however, the owner of the burdened land is prohibited only from
making a particular use of a certain portion of his land, such as
building any structure in a specified area of modifying an existing
structure, then the interest is probably a negative easement.20 6
Since the Witter case involved a permanent right conferred to one
201. Record on Appeal at 29, Wier.
202. See, e.g., Zipp v. Barker, 57 N.Y.S. 569 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1899), a]J'd, 59 N.E.
1133 (N.Y. 1901).
203. BRUCE AND ELY. THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND T1.07 (1988).
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 2.03 (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 1.07.
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landowner over adjoining land and prohibited the owner of the burdened land only from making a particular use of a certain portion of
his land, (building any structure in a specified area) 2 0 7 the interest is
properly classified as an "easement," whether "negative" or "affirmative," rather than a "restrictive covenant."
This distinction was alluded to by the concurring opinion of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in Reed.2" 8 Reed is a case involving what professors Bruce and Ely would categorize as a "negative
easement" imposed on retained land by a deed out from a common
grantor (as in the Witter case).20 9 In his concurrence in Reed, Justice Bobbit noted:
As I see it, the decisions relating to a uniform plan with reference
to restrictive covenants where a developer sells a large number of
lots have no application. In such cases, the question ordinarily
of such restrictive covenants by the purposed is the enforceability
2 10
chasers inter se.

One New York commentator endorsed a Buffalo Academy-type
limitation on constructive notice but nevertheless agreed with a
Reed-type analysis. This commentator surmised that Buffalo Academy should free prospective purchasers from constructive notice only
of those restrictive covenants which a grantor may have undertaken
in one particular deed to generally place in all other deeds of property as part of a uniform plan covering a large subdivision, without
specifically mentioning the particular lot to which the restriction
would be applicable.2 1 1 This commentator acknowledged that "chain

of title" would still encompass "all deeds by prior record owners acpiece of
tually transferring or encumbering the title to the particular
2
land of which the searcher is a prospective purchaser.

21

Another linchpin of the distinction drawn between easements
and Buffqlo Academy-type restrictive covenants is the fact that easements were historically regarded as legal interests which could not
be divested whether or not a purchase of the servient estate took title
207.
208.

Record on Appeal at 158-61, Witter.
Reed v. Elmore, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957); see supra notes 123-132 and accompanying

text.
209. Reed, 98 S.E.2d at 368.
210. Id.
211. See Herbert L. Mendelson, Note, Recorded Deeds Not in Grantee's Direct Chain
of Title Are Not Constructive Notice of Restrictive Covenants, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 394, 396
(1955) (emphasis in original) (citing, Francis S. Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and
Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 174 n.158 (1944)).
212. Id.
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with actual notice. 213 The Recording Act, as a statute in derogation
of the common law, must be read narrowly, so as not to invalidate a
vested interest unless the statute plainly has this as its purpose. 1 4
This is not the case in a Witter-Ammirati type situation, where the
deed establishing the plaintiff's easement was, in fact, recorded as
required by the statute. Thus, the Supreme Court of Vermont, in
Moore v. Center,21 5 approvingly quoted:
In such a case at common law, the purchaser would take subject to
easement previously created, as being a legal interest, irrespective
of whether he has notice thereof, and the rule in this respect could
not well be regarded as changed by the adoption of the recording
law, as applied to a case in which the grant of the easement does
appear of record, though in connection with other lands, to which
the easement is made appurtenant. 1
Indeed, Glorieux v. Lighthipe2" is one of the seminal cases
cited in support of the Buffalo Academy rule, and was, in fact, cited
in Buffalo Academy itself. 218 Yet in Glorieux, which involved a covenant in the nature of an equitable servitude, the Court of Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey expressly held that a Buffalo Academytype rule would not apply to easements:
The case differs from the conveyance of an easement or any interest that lies in grant. A grant takes effect regardless of notice; an
equitable servitude is the creature of equity alone and depends entirely on the existence of notice. Confessedly, Lighthipe's covenant
to insert restrictions in subsequent deeds, was not enforceable at
law against Glorieux. It clearly was not a grant.2 19
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in Garden of Memories, Inc. v. Forest Lawn Memorial Park Ass'n 2 °
while relying on Glorieux, held:
While it is unquestionably the duty of the purchaser to search the
213. See Moore v. Center, 204 A.2d 164, 167 (Vt. 1964); Glorieux v. Lighthpipe, 96 A.
94, 95 (N.J. 1915).
214. Id.
215. 204 A.2d 164 (1964); supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
216. Moore, 204 A.2d at 167 (citing 2 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY & OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND § 567, at 2189 (1920)).
217. 96 A. 94 (N.J. 1915).
218. The Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm, Bros., 196 N.E. 42, 44 (N.Y.
1935).
219. Glorieux, 96 A. at 96.
220. 264 A.2d 82 (1970).

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:101

grantor and other pertinent recording indexes for each holder of
record title for the period during which he held such title . . ., the
apparent philosophy of Glorieux v. Lighthipe (citation omitted), is
that the effect of the recording acts is to relieve a purchaser of
constructive notice of the contents of any recorded deed not in his
strict chain of title except, seemingly, interests 'lying in grant'
(grants of title, easements, etc.) created by a recorded deed of a
prior holder of the title during his tenure.2 '
VIII.

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE Witter Holding

If Ammirati was to be overruled at all, there could be but one
sensible policy rationale for so acting. That rationale was neither advanced by the defendants in Witter, nor considered by the court. The
Buffalo Academy rule itself is inapplicable in those counties which
have tract indexing systems, where encumbrances may be recorded
directly against the affected land and no "name" search need be
made. The Court of Appeals in Andy Associates, Inc. v. Bankers
Trust Co.22 2 held:
[W]here the 'block and lot' indexing method is used, there is no.
logical reason to afford potential purchasers additional protection
by applying the time-honored rule that a purchaser is not chargeable with constructive notice of conveyances recorded outside of his
direct chain of title. That rule, which was developed in cases where
the purchaser had to rely upon 'the grantor-grantee system of indexing, simply represented a pragmatic judicial response to the exigencies of conducting a title search under such a system [citations

omitted] .223
While tract indexing systems are utilized in both Nassau
County and the five counties of New York City, New York State's
other major population centers continue to utilize grantor-grantee indexing systems.224 In, those areas in which name indexing is used, an
221. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
222. 399 N.E.2d 1160 (N.Y. 1979).
223. Id. at 1166.
224. These include Erie County [Buffalo], Westchester County, Tompkins County [Syracuse], Monroe County [Rochester], Albany County, Broome County [Binghamton], and, of
course, Suffolk County. Telephone interviews with Richard Hogan, Broome County Clerk
(Mar. 27, 1992); Aurora Valenti, Tompkins County Clerk (Mar. 27, 1992); Paula Zeman,
Westchester Deputy County Clerk (Mar. 27, 1992); Jane Hewett, Programmer Analyst, Erie
County Clerk's Office (Mar. 27, 1992); Linda Donata, Secretary for the Albany County
Clerk's Office (Mar. 27, 1992); Sue Gruttadaro, Data Entry Cashier, Monroe City (Apr. 3,
1992).
Although far from affording the convenience of a tract index, an alphabetical index
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Ammirati- Witter situation will be relatively rare, since such a situation presupposes the existence of an easement over adjoining property once held in unitary ownership, individually severed rather than
generally subdivided, with no physical indication of the easement's
existence - such as an easement of light, air, and/or view (Witter)
or one which has been obliterated and forgotten although not technically "abandoned" (Ammirati) - and no mention of the easement
in the conveyance of the servient estate. In most cases, however, one
preparing to purchase property will be able to observe physical evidence of the easement, e.g., the road or path across the property, the
vehicles or people moving thereon, the wires or pipes which had been
placed thereon, etc.
The Court of Appeals might therefore have concluded that since
situations in which dominant property owners would require the protection of the Ammirati rule would be relatively rare, while the increased level of title examination required by the Ammirati rule,
even if minimal, would affect every title search performed in a
county with a name indexing system, the burdens would be disproportionately high compared to the benefits. In a "balancing of evils,"
therefore, the property rights of innocents such as Mrs. Ammirati
and Mr. Witter, solely because of their infrequency, might have been
deliberately sacrificed by the Court of Appeals to the countervailing
economic interest of title companies. Such a result, based on the
"practical exigencies" of these sui generis facts, might have been
225
extremely limited in its effect.
makes it possible to run a chain of title, either forward or backward, from any
known owner. A searcher may begin with the name of the present owner and work
backward under the proper letter of the grantee index till he finds the name of that
party as grantee in a deed for the land involved. The data regarding the deed is
copied from the index and the process repeated as to the grantor in that deed, thus
finding the earlier deed in which he was grantee, and so on back for a certain number of years or back to the original grant from a sovereignty. In order to ascertain
mortgages and other encumbrances, the grantor indices must then be run forward
as to each name for the period that the party of that name owned the premises.
Another method of search is to run the grantor indices, running the name of an
early owner till the deed from him is found, then to run the name of the party to
whom he conveyed and so on down to the date of search, noting en route the incumbrance given by the respective owner.
PATTON, supra note 46, § 67 (2d ed. 1950) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
225. The conclusion underlying such a "balancing" analysis would, however, itself be
based upon a presumption with no Record support, i.e., that Ammirati was not, prior to Witter, already being followed by title companies. In fact, if one presumes that title companies are
entities capable of conforming their conduct and practices to legal precedent, then there is no
basis for presuming that they were capable of conforming their actions to the dictates of Buf-
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The Witter court, however, failed to honestly and straightforwardly adopt such an analysis, opting instead to create a distinction
between Ammirati and Witter, and a harmonization between Ammirati and Buffalo Academy. In so doing, it adopted a restrictive
definition of the term "chain of title." The Witter court held:
[P]urchasers like the Taggarts should not be penalized for failing
to search every chain of title branching out from a common grantor's roots in order to unearth potential restrictive covenants. They
are legally bound to search only within their own tree trunk line
and are bound by constructive or inquiry notice only of restrictions
which appear in deeds or other instruments of conveyance in that
primary stem.226
But confining the parameters of a required search to a purchaser's "own tree trunk line" - in effect ruling contrary to all prior
authority that the chain of title may be constructed solely by running the title backwards from the present owner - excludes from
the Witter court's definition of "chain of title" even prior recorded
deeds out of the same premises! Such a result, by permitting property to be "sold twice," vitiates the very purpose of the recording
statute, and bears the potential for chaos! 7
The Witter court was nevertheless constrained to hold in this
fashion if it wished to reach its result without overruling Ammirati.
The only alternative would have been to acknowledge that the term
"chain of title" has, as recognized by Moore v. Center,1 8 Pusey v.
Clayton22 9 , and Reed v. Elmore2 3 ° , a broader scope than the simplistically rigid one adopted by the Witter court, and rejected by
Ammirati.
The Court of Appeals suggested that Howell (Witter's predecessor) allegedly could have preserved the easement "by recording in
the servient chain the conveyance creating the covenant rights so as
falo Academy but not Ammirati.
226. Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 342 (N.Y. 1991).
227. By way of example, if Grantor sold Blackacre to A on January 1, and then once
again sold Blackacre to B on February 1, the sale to B would presumably be invalid, since
having already transferred Blackacre to A, Grantor had no interest in Blackacre to convey to
B on February 1. Yet, under Witter, when B re-sells Blackacre, his buyer will not be held to
constructive notice of the prior sale to A since the deed to A is a "deed out" to one who is not
B's "direct predecessor," and whose name thus does not appear in B's "own tree trunk line," or
"primary stem." See Witter, 577 N.E.2d at 342.
228. See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
230. See'supra notes 123-133 and accompanying text.
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to impose notice on subsequent purchasers of the servient land
. . "231 This suggestion appears to reveal a fundamental misunderstanding by the Witter court of the distinction between a tract
indexing system and name indexing system. In a name, as opposed to
a tract, indexing system, instruments cannot be recorded against the
land or the parcel itself. Thus, the Witter court's suggestion is one
which would have been impossible to follow. Since Witter's predecessor was not a direct predecessor in title of Taggart, Witter's name,
whether placed on a deed of the dominant parcel containing an easement across the retained servient estate, or whether placed on a separate "deed of easement", could not and would not have appeared in
the "tree trunk line" of the Taggarts' direct predecessors, and thus,
according to the Witter court's definition of "chain of title," could
not have provided any protection. Indeed, this is what was perceived
by the Ammirati trial court which, based on Buffalo Academy, had
dismissed the plaintiff easement owner's complaint with the lament
that "[w]hat action an owner of a dominant estate should take to
2 32
protect his easement where similar facts exist, I do not know.
CONCLUSION

The fully restrictive nature of the Witter court's "chain of title"
definition is illogical and counterproductive. The court in Witter
should either have reversed and awarded judgment to Witter based
upon the Ammirati decision, or, should have overruled Ammirati
while explaining its decision in terms of the sui generis facts as those
facts relate to the economic interests at stake. By insisting on affirming judgment for the servient landowner but refusing to overrule
Ammirati, the court was led to issue an opinion which plays fast and
loose in its recapitulation of the facts of Ammirati, and which has
led to presumably unintended consequences, including such a dra231. Witter, 577 N.E.2d at 342.
232. Ammirati v. Wire Forms, Inc., 76 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Even if the
Witter Court's suggestion was viewed as an acknowledgement that its restrictive chain of title
definition is ephemeral, and that deeds "out" from a common grantor must be reviewed (at
least as to their metes and bounds description), thus implying that a separate deed of easement
containing a metes and bounds description of the servient parcel would give notice to a subsequent purchaser of the servient parcel, this suggestion does not provide much solace to Witter.
When Howell, Witter's predecessor, took title from the parties' common grantor in 1951 three years after the Appellate Division's decision in, and the Court of Appeals' affirmance of,
Ammirati, and one year following the Appellate Division's decision in Long Building - no
real estate counsel or title company could have imagined that such a separate instrument was
required, nor that an easement contained in a written deed would be voided forty years later
by the Court of Appeals.

138

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:101

matic restriction of the term "chain of title" as to strip that term of
all utility, and an equally-dramatic expansion of the term "easement
by necessity" broadening it beyond all prior expectation and desire.

